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A NOTE Ol'J LUXURY IMPORT/3, THE SAVINGS RATE,
AND HELFARE

R. Albert Berry
October 1'7, 1967

Note:

Center Discussion Papers are preliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical
comment. References in publications to Discussion
Papers should be cleared with the author to pro
tect the tentative character of these papers.

A NOTE ON LUXURY IMPORTS, THE SAVINGS RATE, AND WELFARE

In the making of economic policy for underdeveloped countries it is
often almost assumed that the curtailing of luxury imports can be beneficial
to the economy in some or all of the following ways:
a}

by diverting funds which would otherwise have been spent on these
luxury items to savings and hence to investment, thus increasing the
rate of growth.

b}

by increasing the use of domestic inputs, to the extent that the
funds previously spent on luxury consumer imports are still spent
on consumer items, but now consumer items produced at home, and

c}

by redistributing the income from the rich to the not so rich.

While it is certainly clear that all of these results are possible, their
inevitability is not at all clear, and deserves some more careful analysis.
Before proceeding to analyze the question in more complex situations
such as those where there is not a free exchange rate or where there is labor
surplus, we consider the question within the simplest possible economic frame
work.

Luxury Import Restriction in a Purely Competitive Economy, with a
Free Exchange Rate and No Surplus Labor
Throughout the discussion to follow, an implicit assumption is .that the
marginal utility of income is different for different groups of people,
being lower for a "rich group 11 and higher for ~he rest of the population.
It will simplify the exposition to consider henceforth that these are two
discreet groups, the rich and the poor.

The extent to which the marginal

utility of income differs for the two groups is not something which need con
cern us in order to elucidate the qualtivative arguments presented below.
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Consider first a situation in which luxury imports are completely pro
hibited.

If this action had the desired effect of leading to a substantial

reduction in total consumption on the part of the rich, it would presumably
be to the long-run benefit of the poor in that the increasing domestic capital
stock resulting from the investment of the rich (as long as they did not send
their savings abroad) would lead to an increase in wage rates in the future
greater than that which would otherwise have occurred.

Note however, that

the decrease in the welfare of the rich is not a sufficient condition for in
creased welfare on the part of the rest of the population through higher sav
ings, since both the real consumption and the savings of the rich could fall
as the prices of the goods they buy rise due to the import restrictions.

The

actual likelihood that the rich will increase their savings as a result of
the import restrictions depends, of course, on the insistency of their demand
for the items previously imported or for substitutes for these.

If the demand

for the previously imported items is inelastic and the good can be locally
produced, an overall loss to the economy is very likely to result.

For the

rich will wind up with less of the luxury goods than they previously had,
although spending a greater proportion of their income on them, and the goods
will be produced at a greater per unit cost locally than they were in the
rest of the world,

It is possible for more resources to be used up in the

production of the luxury goods than were used up in producing the exports
which previously allowed a greater number of luxury goods to be imported.
Such a situation is illustrated in Figure I.

The resources utilized in the

-3--

I

\
S1

Domestic Supply

s ---

0

F

Figure 1

C

Quantity

-4acquisition of the luxury items
rectangle

P BCO
w

vn1en

they were imported are measured by the

provided the elasticity- of supply of exports is infinite in

the relevant range, or somewhat less than

P BCO , provided that the supply
w

curve of exports is somewhat upward slopingl(price being measured in terms of
alternative goods given up).

The resource costs of producing the luxury items

at home are given by SEFO with

SE

being horizontal when the domestic supply

curves of the luxury goods is horizontal over the relevant range.

If both

the supply curve of the luxury i terns at home and the supply curve of the ex-
ports are perf-=ctly elastic, then with the inelastic demand for these luxury
goods, more resources would be used up at home producing a, smaller supply
after the import barrier 1.1ad been put into effect than were used to obtain
the original imports.

'rhus only if the rich people curtailed their consump

tion of other items by a greater amount than enough to make up for the increa
sed domestic resources required to pay for the luxuries after the quota,
would there be more resources left to produce either consumer items for the
poor people or investment goods.

i-lhether total savings would go up is an

empirical question ·with the result presumably varying according to the spe-
cific situation.

Those theories where savings is considered to be a resi-

dual would suggest a fall in total savings in such a case; in that event
the net welfare effect would be negative both for the rich people and for
the poor people.

To the extent that infant industry gains in efficiency could

be achieved in the domestic production of the luxury items, the resource costs
would gradually go down, and if the country became competitive the negative
effects would probably be wiped out at about the same time for both the
1

It could be represented, for example, by

EF.

-5rich and. the poor. 1

If the donestic price eventually fell below the world

price, one would expect both rich and poor to gain, if they had both l)een
losing before.
Different savings theories could lead to results opposite to those
reached above.

Thus the nature of the savings or consumption function is

of paramount importance.
A parallel but somewhat different situation prevails in cases where
as a result of the restrictions of luxury imports the rich switched to the
purchase of different type goods in the domestic market.

The increase in

total demand for these goods may either benefit or harm the poor people de
pending on whether this increased demand leads, through a learning process,
to eventual decrease in real costs, or whether it leads to an increase in
price.

It is always possible that the lack of really close domestically

produced substitutes for the previously imported luxury goods will make
total savings either greater or less than they would have been had a closer
substitute been available.

Once again the short-run effect on the rich is

definitely negative, and the short--run effect on the poor as well as the
long-run effect may be either positive or negative.
1
This would be most likely to be true if the elasticity of domestic supply
of the luxury type good was the same as the elasticity of supply of the
exports previously used to attain the luxury goods through international
trade. In this case, when the price of the domestically produced luxury
good has fallen to the international level so that as far as the purchase
of it is concerned the rich are in the same situation as when it was im•
ported, the same value of resources is being used as before. Hence the
quantity of other goods produced is the same. If the prices of the other
goods purchased by the rich are the same as before the import curtailment,
their savings will be the same. When the domestic price of the luxury goods
fall a little lower, their savings may be expected to rise, thus benefiting
the poor. But suppose the elasticity of supply of exports is greater than of
home produced luxury goods. Then, when the price of the luxury goods is the
same as before, less resources will be left for the production of other goods,
and the savings of the rich will presulably be lower.

If any terr;,s of trade gains are possible for the country in question, the
previous analysis may have slightly overestin;.ated the possibility of loss,
The analysis so far has pointed to the possible inefficiency created
by the complete prohibition of a' good, due to the fact that it may be impos
sible to prevent its domestic production, or the consumption by the rich of
domestiGally produced substitutes+• 2 It is clear that unless an actual tax
system is used there can be no guarantee that total savings and total invest
ment will be increased,

One can therefore ask which of the three alternatives--

complete prohibition, tariffs, or domestic excise taxes will be the best in
any particular case.

We focus first on the extent of resource utilization

in the production of goods consumed by the rich assuming a constant savings
rate on their part.

Regardless of the elasticity of demand for the luxury

goods a tariff is always superior to a quota in these terms.
strated in Figure 2
question,

DD'

where

PP'

WW

This is demon-

6 ives the world price of the commodity in

gives the demand curve on the part of the rich for the item

in question, (we assume it is not consumed at all by the poor) and

SS '

gives the domestic supply curve of the item.
We consider the imposition of a tariff of such a height as to make
the new import price to the consumer (indicated by the horizontal line
PtPt)

the same as i.t would be under complete prohibition.

In this particu

lar case, the welfare of the rich is the same whether complete prohibition
or a tariff is imposed, (because we have drawn the demand curve, the domestic
1 we have implicitly assumed that in prohibiting the importation of some types
of luxury goods, the government does not allow demand to spill over into the
importation of substitutes for them. If this occurs, the same type of loss
as we have just described may occur, and even possillly be increased by a nega.
~ive terms of trade effect.
im
luxury
of
prohibition
the
by
more
barmed
It is possible for the poor to be
portsthanof necessities. F'or if the necessities have a relatively elastic supply
at home and are produced at only a small comparative disadvantage, the small price
the poor must pay in the short run (,:iore expensive i te:ris) may be more than offset
by the subsequent increases in out:r>ut resulting from the savings allowed because
the rich were not squeezed.
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-8supply curve, and the international price line with tariff such as to coincide
at

A), and the total domestic supply fa in each case produced domestically.

( In

no customs duties are

fact the two situations are identical in all respects.)
collected.

P.,,lt

Increases in the tariff about the level
the situation.

The interesting question is--which of a complete prohibition

and a tariff lower than
to

pwptt

the area

will have no effect on

PwPt

is preferable?

Suppose the tariff is lowered

The rich then achieve an ad6.itional consumer surplus given by
PtABPtt

The social welfare to which this is equal is by assump•··

tion smaller than the comparable income gained by the poor.
ment revenues increase by

FBML

and the total resources used in order to fur

nish the rich with the luxury items if
plus

LMGH

Meanwhile, govern~

(for domestic production of them)

OSFH

(to produce the exports exchanged for the imports of the luxury

goods), 1where previously it was
is greater than the area

DMGB

OSAB .

It can be seen that if' the area

FADL

than all groups in the J)Opulation, including the

rich, the government and everyone else could be expected to gain through the
use of the tariff as opposed to the prohibition.

One can easily calculate the

combination of slopes of the demand and supply curves, assuming that these are
linear, which would bring about this effect.

2

rhe condition for the net change

1

in value of goods available to the private sector plus funds in the hands of
the government to be positive is clearly easy to satisly.

Even under the most

extreme assumption with
1Assuming the supply curve of exports to be horizontal in the relevant range.
2

specifically, the condition is
1
>

al
where
curve.

is the slope of the supply curve and

b

1

is the slope of the demand

-9respect to the effect of the lower price of the luxury consumer goods on total
savings by the rich it would be hard to envision the net effect beine; negative,
While it is thus easy to derr.onstrate that• with savings a fixed propor
tion of income, a tariff is likely to be s1.,perior to prohibition, it is always
true that an excise tax is superior to a tariff (as long as the tariff is suf-ficiently high to lead domestic production; otherwise its presence is irrele-

vant).

p p

But suppose the tariff level is established at

(Figure 3) so

w wt

that in the absence of an excise tax do,nesti.c production would occur to the
extent of

OM

and. an amount

MJ

would be imported.

How if instead. of a

simple tariff an excise tax had been used, the foreir~n supply curve to the

domestic economy would be the same (i.e.:,
curve would be different,

instead of

no domestic product:i.on would occur.

SS 1

Ptp

t , but

the do:-r..estic sup::;ily

it would ·be

S S' .
e e

As

1:,,

result

'l'he welfare of the rich would be the

same in each case since they would pay the sat:e price.
nue would be increased. fro1n the original

ABCD

To~al soverrunent reve-

to tbe new level of

P,BCP
i:;
w

The resources used up in the acquisition of the luxury items would decrease
by the amount

SADP

w

Thus the use of the excise tax as a :)olicy tool com-

pletely dominates that of the tariff alone, in cases where the tariff would
be high enough to lead to some domestic production.
Both the excise tax and the tariff break a condition for Pareto optimum,
so no geperal theorem can predict which is better in a specific case.

In the

present case the excise tax is as good as or ·better than the tariff as a re
sult of the fact that it always leads to a smaller or equal amount of luxury
goods

consumed, and implies that the real cost per unit of those goods

consumed is equal to or less than in the case of the tariff.

By assumption,
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the smaller consumption of luxury goods is better j_f the real cost per unit is
constant.
When the savings rate of the rich is not assumed to be constant, but is
a decreasing function of the prices of the luxury goods, then the relative de
sirability of the three policies remains tbe same, though with the welfare
gaps between them

are

greater.

If savings is an increasing function of the

prices of the luxury goods, the result can be reversed,

Even if one concluded

that savings was a d.ecTeasing function of these prices, it could be relevant
to try to quantify the welfare differences among the policies, in the event
that administrative costs vary amon.13 theu.

The adrninistrati.ve costs night be

higher for excise taxes than for tariffs, as an example.

Luxury Import Restrictions with Market I,nperfections
We have seen that in an economy -with no market imperfections, it can
be a mistake to prohibit im:;;orts of luxury goods.

In fact the case against

such prohibition may be even stronger given the conditions prevailing in many
less developed countries.
tain overvalued currencies.

liany countries, for a variety of reasons, main
And they feel that nost of their foreign exchange

should be devoted to capital and intermediate goods--in :particular that it
should not be used for luxury imports.

The domestic production of these goods

then begins, and since many of them are relatively capital intensive and re
quire large imports of machinery and. of intermediate goods, the balance of
payments savings may be very small or conceivably even negative.

In situa

tions where loss would have occurred with an equilibrium exchange rate, it
will be greater with an overvalued one~ since the subsidy on the imports of

--12capital and intermediate goods lowers the private (but not the social) cost
of production in the industry and leads to a higher output, which adds to the
loss (unless the savings function is extremely unusual).

The costs of do

mestic production of luxury goods are thus especially easy to underestimate
in systems where the exchange rate is overvalued, and the capital and inter
mediate goods come in at a low exchange rate.
In an imperfect market situation with unemployment of some resources~
it may be argued that the diversion of demand for imports to the home market
is beneficial since it leads to a fuller utilization of those resources.
The social cost of the newly produced items would be less than the private
course.

But in fact the unemployment of resources do not in general imply

any greater desirability of diverting demand from imports to domestic pro
duction, but only the need to make production more attractive in general~
Where no administra~

either of exports or of goods to be consumed at home.

tive machinery can be set up to stimulate production in general, an import
control program could be desirable.
Our arguments so far, based on a classical model or not too extreme
variants of it, have implied that there is never any

11

balance of payments"

argument for restricting imports (of luxury goods or of anything else).
In fact this is one of the major reasons adduced by most countries.

Although

many of their arguments seem faulty, it is at least possible that there are a
number of countries in which devaluation is doomed to failure because of its
effects on domestic prices.

Then the price mechanism may not be a feasible

one by which to allocate foreign exchange, and it may be necessary to pro
hibit the importation of items whose increasing scarcity will not help to con
tinue or start price spirals.
obvious choice on this count.

Luxury consumer goods would seem to be the

